

What Drives Perceptions of Partisan Cooperation?

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Complete List of Authors:	Santoso, Lie Philip; Duke Kunshan University, Stevenson, Randolph; Rice University Weschle, Simon; Syracuse University
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Abstract

What drives voters' perceptions of partisan cooperation? In this letter, we investigate whether voters have accurate beliefs about which parties regularly cooperate with one another, and whether these beliefs follow the real-time portrait of cooperation between parties that is reported in the news. We combine original survey data of voters' perceptions of party cooperation in four countries over two time periods with a measure of parties' public relationships as reported by the media. We find that voters' perceptions of cooperation and conflict among parties do reflect actual patterns of interactions. This pattern holds even after controlling for policy differences between parties as well as joint cabinet membership. Furthermore, we show that the impact of contemporary events on cooperation perceptions is most pronounced for voters who monitor the political news more carefully. Our findings have important implications for partisan cooperation and mass-elite linkages.

A great deal of recent scholarship paints a picture in which “most democratic citizens are uninterested in politics, poorly informed, and unwilling or unable to convey coherent policy preferences” (Achen and Bartels 2016: 14; see also Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Nyhan and Reifler 2010). At the same time, other work has challenged this view, showing that voters have the ability to reasonably attribute responsibility for collective decisions (Duch et al 2015), have well-formed expectations about which multiparty cabinets will form (Gschwend et al 2017), have sensible acumen in predicting what policies coalition governments will implement (Bowler et al 2020), and have reasonably good understanding of the sizes of the parties (Lee et al 2019). In this note, we explore this theme further by focusing on a dimension of political information that is as understudied as it is important to a rapidly growing body of work in comparative politics. Specifically, we examine voters’ views of the extent to which different parties cooperate with one another. Such beliefs about partisan cooperation (or conflict) have played a critical role in several influential theories of mass political behavior in recent years. For example, such beliefs are thought to impact levels of strategic voting (Bargsted and Kedar 2009), perceptions of party policy positions (Adams et al 2021; Lee et al 2021), and the extent to which voters hold parties accountable for economic performance (Duch and Stevenson 2008). Likewise, numerous studies have suggested that voters have preferences for (either more or less) partisan cooperation and may punish and reward parties on this basis (Harbridge and Malhotra 2011, Druckman et al 2013).

Given its increasing prominence in explanations of voters’ political behaviors, it is likewise increasingly urgent that scholars understand the sources and limitation of voters’ beliefs about the patterns of partisan cooperation in their systems. Do voters have accurate beliefs about

which parties historically cooperate with one another and which do not? Do these beliefs reflect more contemporary differences in the level of cooperation driven by party strategies? Do prominent instances of conflict and cooperation impact voters' perceptions of partisan cooperation or are these events either missed by most voters, or discounted as relatively short-term tactical moves – unreflective of more fundamental patterns of cooperation driven by more long-term factors like parties' ideological compatibility or history of cooperation in government?

In this letter, we report a first effort to answer these questions using original data which measure voters' perceptions of the extent to which party dyads in four countries (at two time periods) cooperate with one another. Further, we utilize the Quantified Political Relationships (QPR) data (Weschle 2018) on real cooperative and conflictual events between parties to examine the extent to which voters' perceptions of partisan conflict and cooperation for party dyads follow the changing real-time portrait of cooperation and conflict reported in the news.

We find that voters' perceptions of cooperation and conflict among political parties do reflect their actual pattern of interactions, as reported by the media. In other words, if there are many reports about cooperative interactions between two parties, voters on average will perceive them to have a positive relationship, and if there are many reports about conflict, voters will think that the parties have a conflictual relation. Importantly, this relationship holds controlling for (actual or perceived) policy differences between parties, as well as (current or past) joint cabinet membership. Furthermore, we find that voters who monitor the political news carefully give a great deal more weight to contemporary events in their perceptions than do less engaged voters. However, the typical less-engaged voter still largely gets the long-term

patterns of partisan cooperation in their countries correct. In sum, contrary to the findings that people generally are politically uninformed, we find that on average, voters still hold broadly accurate beliefs about which parties cooperate with one another, and which one's do not.

What Drives Perceptions of Partisan Cooperation?

In this paper, we are interested in both the overall sensibility of voters' perceptions of partisan cooperation and conflict, and whether the most important drivers of these perceptions are short-term cooperative or conflictual events or longer-term relationships between parties that are rooted in their histories of co-governance and/or their relative ideological profiles. Thus, the main theoretical hypothesis that we seek to test is:

H1: *Voters' perceptions of the extent to which any two parties cooperate or conflict will track news reports about real world instances of cooperation and conflict between the parties.*

The theoretical motivation for this is straightforward. When parties publicly cooperate or conflict with one another, these events are reported in the news. Further, under almost any model of how individuals process and use such mediated messages, they will have discernible impact on aggregate perceptions of partisan cooperation and conflict. For example, this follows directly from on-line processing and memory-based models of perception formation (Taber and Lodge 2006, Zaller 1992).¹

Of course, contemporary political events are not the only potential drivers of citizens' perceptions of partisan conflict and cooperation. Beginning in school and early political

¹ See Appendix 4 for a brief explanation of foundational models of attitude formation.

socialization, most citizens of western democracies learn about two other characteristics of (pairs of) parties that are likely relevant to their inferences about partisan cooperation and conflict: the broad ideological relationships between parties (e.g., which parties are “leftists” and which are not) and the typical patterns of cooperation between parties in cabinet. Thus, we will also examine the following two hypotheses:

H2: *Voters will perceive any two parties to be more cooperative (at the time of our survey) the longer the two parties have served together in cabinet.*

H3: *Voters will perceive any two parties to be more cooperative (at the time of our survey), the more the parties agree on policy.*

Finally, voters clearly differ in the extent to which they are interested in politics and in how closely they follow the political news (their levels of “habitual news reception”). The theoretical narrative that motivates H1 however is simply that cooperative and conflictual events between parties will drive voters’ perceptions of partisan conflict and cooperation *because* voters see reports of these events in the news. If voters do not see such reports, the path from the events to perceptions is broken and so we should expect that evidence for H1 will be less prevalent among citizens who follow the political news less faithfully.²

H4: The relationship described in H1 will be stronger for individuals who pay more attention to political news.

² In Appendix 5, we also discuss our expectations and results for the conditioning effect of habitual news reception on the other drivers in H2 and H3.

Measurement

In this section, we describe how we measure the dependent variable in each of the hypotheses above (voters' perceived levels of cooperation and conflict between each party dyad) as well as our measure of real-world cooperation and conflict between parties (the key explanatory variable in H1 and H4). We focus on these two variables in the text because both are likely to be less familiar to many readers. By the same logic, however, we relegate discussion of how we measured the other theoretical concepts to Appendix 6. That said, in our results tables we have included details about these variables that should be sufficient for readers to understand what we have done without reference to the Appendix.

Measuring Perceptions of Partisan Cooperation

Our measure of voters' perceptions of partisan cooperation comes from a question we asked in seven original surveys that we conducted in Denmark (2019), Germany (2018, 2019), Canada (2017, 2019), and the United Kingdom (2017, 2019).³

In each survey, respondents were shown a pair of parties and asked the following question:

How often do you think these two parties cooperate with each other in [your country's] federal politics? [answer categories: (0) "Never cooperate" to (10) "Almost always cooperate"]

In all but one survey, we asked each respondent about each pair of parties that had seats in the legislature at the time of the survey. Thus, respondents across countries saw between 10 and


³ Details of the survey design and sample are included in Appendix 1.

15 such pairs.⁴ We did not allow respondents to skip the question for any dyad or to say “Don’t Know.” Instead, they were encouraged to guess if they were uncertain (Mondak and Davis 2001).

Figures A3.1 to A3.4 in Appendix 3 show the full distribution of responses to this question for all party-dyads in each of our countries and time periods. In Figure 1 below, we illustrate the message of these distributions with data from our survey in Germany in 2019. Clearly, this figure (which is typical of the others), suggests that German voters have no trouble answering the question in ways that are sensible. The highest average cooperation score (6.58 on a 0-10 scale) is between the CDU/CSU and the SPD, which had been in a governing coalition at the time of this survey for six years. Likewise, the traditional pairings of the SPD and Greens and CDU and FDP come next at 5.73 and 5.69, respectively. Finally, German voters – quite sensibly – identify the least likely cooperators as the various left parties (Green, Linke, and SDP) with the far-right AfD. These sensible patterns of results extend to the larger set of countries and cases (see Appendix 3).

Figure 1: Distribution of Perceived Cooperation among German Parties in 2019

⁴ In the UK 2017 surveys, we randomly sampled 8 of the 10 available dyads.



Measuring Partisan Cooperative and Conflictual Events

To measure the patterns of real-world episodes of cooperation and conflict between parties as reported in the news, we use the Quantified Political Relationships (QPR) data that was developed by Weschle (2018) and vetted in several high-profile publications (Adams et al 2021, Fortunato 2021). It uses large-scale machine-coded event data from news reports as inputs to latent factor network models to provide a measure of the cooperative or conflictual tone of the relationships among a large set of political and societal actors.

The event data are taken from the Integrated Crises Early Warning System (ICEWS) project (O'Brien 2013). As its source material, it takes reports published in Factiva and the Open Source Center, two of the largest media repositories that collate material from hundreds of national

and international news sources. These stories are then machine-coded by a natural language analysis system to identify and extract the events. Specifically, the algorithm extracts information on the event's source and target and then classifies the event type into one of more than 350 categories. The QPR dataset focuses on domestic interactions only and further processes the relevant ICEWS events data in two ways: First, every actor is hand-coded as being partisan-political, nonpartisan-political, or societal. All politicians from the same party are aggregated into a single partisan actor. Second, the various event types are dichotomized into either cooperative or conflictual. For example, a 2014 news report on the party convention of the UK's Conservative party contained the sentence "[i]n a polished and at times emotional speech that closed his party convention, Mr. Cameron mocked Labour and its leader, Ed Miliband." This is coded as a conflictual interaction where the Conservative Party (represented by its leader David Cameron) is the source and the Labour Party is the target.

Next, the large number of such cooperative or conflictual events recoded in the ICEWS data are summarized using a latent factor network model (Minhas et al. 2019). The basic idea is to infer the network that gives rise to the observed patterns of interactions by locating all actors in a low-dimensional social space. Actors that tend to interact more cooperatively are located in the same direction in that space, whereas those who tend to interact in a mostly conflictual manner are located in different directions. Importantly, the estimated network not only takes direct interactions into account, but also third-order relations (e.g. a friend of a friend is a friend). This is important since voters likely take such higher-order relations into account when assessing levels of partisan cooperation and conflict. For example, if unions cooperate with one party but conflict with another, this provides the voter with information that the two parties likely to

have a conflictual relation with each other. The relation between a pair of actors can be computed by multiplying their positions in the social space. These are the QPR cooperation scores, where larger values indicate a more cooperative relationship, and negative values a more conflictual one. For technical details, see Weschle (2018) and Appendix 6.

To measure patterns of partisan cooperation, we use cooperation scores based on all reported events in a country in the 365 days before the first day a given survey was in the field.⁵ For a few of the parties in our surveys we do not have a cooperation score. This is the case if the ICEWS data do not contain any events involving the party in the relevant period, which can happen with smaller parties. In our preferred specifications, we drop all dyads for which we do not have cooperation data. However, as a robustness check we also show specifications where party pairs that do not have a cooperation score are assigned a score of zero – indicating the substantively meaningful idea that little news about the relationship between the pair was available to citizens monitoring the news. In the end, the results of this exercise (presented in Table A2.1, A2.3, A2.7, and A2.9 in Appendix 2) are very similar to the results presented below.

Research Design and Methods

To explore H1-H4, we estimate a series of regression models in which a row of data is a respondent-[party-dyad] and the dependent variable is the respondent's dyadic cooperation score (0-10) described above. Our main independent variable is the QPR cooperation score. We

⁵ For robustness check, we estimate models with cooperation scores based on events in the six months before a survey in Appendix 2.

also include measures of parties' ideological distance (actual or perceived) as well as variables capturing their joint cabinet membership (actual or perceived, past, or present).

We stack the data from all countries into a single data set. Since each respondent answered about many dyads and each dyad was asked of many respondents, we use multilevel regression models that include crossed random intercepts for respondent and dyad. Importantly, several of our explanatory variables are themselves estimated quantities with available information about their uncertainty (e.g., the QPR score and the manifesto-based RILE measure of party left-right positions). We propagate this uncertainty through our empirical models by calculating and reporting bootstrapped standard errors as described in Appendix 7.

Finally, as explained in more detail in Appendix 6, we have measured each of the theoretical concepts in our hypotheses in several different (but equally justifiable) ways. For the events data and histories of cabinet participation we have used various time windows. Likewise, for party policy differences and patterns of joint cabinet participation we have both perceptual and objective measures. Clearly, it would be inappropriate to include all the alternative measures of the same concept in the same empirical model (Achen 1982), so instead we estimate a series of models, each of which includes only one measure of each of the key explanatory concepts in our hypotheses. For robustness (and because we have no strong theoretical reason to prefer any one measure of each concept), we estimate models for each permutation of these various measures. This results in many sets of results – all of which are reported in Appendix 2. In the tables reported in the text, we choose six representative models that capture the substantive story well – and that, as it turns out, differ little from the many other specifications reported in the appendices. *Indeed, the overall consistency of the results across each of these different*

model specifications testifies to the strength of the relationship we find. In other words, the relationship we find are strongly “in the data” and are not dependent on the specific specification of the empirical model.

Results

We begin our discussion of the results with the models in Table 1. The most important message from this table is simply that every estimate, in every model, conforms to our expectations. The positive and significant coefficients on cooperative and conflictual events in Models A-F all confirm H1 – suggesting that our respondents, on average, do pay attention to the vagaries of contemporary events when thinking about how much parties cooperate or conflict. At the same time, however, both of our measures of the ideological spread of the dyad (in all 12 specifications) are negative and statistically different from zero as expected in H2. When parties disagree more on policy (either objectively or as perceived by our respondents) voters see them as less cooperative. Finally, current (perceived or objective) joint cabinet membership and a history co-governance are strongly associated with perceptions of greater partisan cooperation in each of these models (and the many others in Appendix 2). This confirms H3.

The effect of the tone of interactions reported in the news on perceived cooperation is also substantively meaningful. A one standard deviation increase in reported cooperation is associated with a 0.092-0.116-point increase in the perceived level of cooperation (and for individuals with high levels of news reception, effects are roughly twice as large -- see below). This is comparable to a 3.5-4-point increase in the RILE distance between two parties, or about one sixth of the effect of the respondent believing that two parties are in a coalition together.

Table 1: Drivers of Perceptions of Partisan Conflict and Cooperation

DV: Perceived level of cooperation between parties <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> (avg:4.34, sd:2.5)	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L
Events												
Cooperative & Conflictual Events between parties <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> over the last year (avg: 0.048, sd: 0.52)	0.183 (0.035)	0.184 (0.036)	0.177 (0.035)	0.217 (0.044)	0.223 (0.042)	0.216 (0.044)	0.034 (0.045)	0.05 (0.046)	0.028 (0.046)	0.07 (0.052)	0.087 (0.051)	0.064 (0.051)
Habitual News Reception (Base=Low Habitual News Reception)												
Medium Habitual News Reception							-0.452 (0.023)	-0.429 (0.023)	-0.452 (0.023)	-0.324 (0.025)	-0.302 (0.025)	-0.325 (0.024)
High Habitual News Reception							-0.71 (0.024)	-0.653 (0.024)	-0.71 (0.024)	-0.552 (0.025)	-0.495 (0.025)	-0.552 (0.025)
Events Score* Habitual News Reception (Base=Low Habitual News Reception)												
Events Score*Medium Habitual News Reception							0.135 (0.043)	0.126 (0.043)	0.136 (0.043)	0.142 (0.041)	0.132 (0.04)	0.141 (0.041)
Events Score*High Habitual News Reception							0.26 (0.049)	0.228 (0.049)	0.261 (0.049)	0.273 (0.047)	0.24 (0.045)	0.271 (0.046)
Ideological Distance												
Avg. Perceived LR distance between parties <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> (avg: 3.37, sd: 3.63)				-0.26 (0.004)	-0.25 (0.004)	-0.26 (0.004)				-0.253 (0.004)	-0.247 (0.004)	-0.253 (0.004)
Manifesto LR Distance between parties <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> (avg: 23.7, sd: 16.7)	-0.035 (0.01)	-0.033 (0.01)	-0.03 (0.007)				-0.034 (0.011)	-0.033 (0.011)	-0.029 (0.008)			
Joint Cabinet Membership												
Current Cabinet Membership (1 = parties <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> in current cabinet)	2.11 (0.93)			1.72 (0.90)			2.15 (0.936)			1.73 (0.908)		
Current Perceived Cabinet Membership (1 = R identified parties <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> as current cabinet members)		0.66 (0.025)			0.6 (0.025)			0.582 (0.025)			0.547 (0.025)	
% months in previous 10 years that parties <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> have served in cabinet (avg: 4.25, sd:13.1)			0.044 (0.007)			0.041 (0.007)			0.044 (0.007)			0.041 (0.007)
Constant	5.19 (0.26)	5.09 (0.26)	4.82 (0.2)	5.23 (0.14)	5.14 (0.14)	4.98 (0.12)	5.58 (0.26)	5.47 (0.272)	5.21 (0.202)	5.52 (0.145)	5.41 (0.144)	5.27 (0.117)
Random Intercepts												
Party Dyad	0.819 (0.196)	0.858 (0.203)	0.425 (0.101)	0.785 (0.177)	0.793 (0.018)	0.428 (0.097)	0.837 (0.2)	0.88 (0.208)	0.439 (0.104)	0.793 (0.179)	0.806 (0.182)	0.432 (0.098)
Individuals	0.387 (0.02)	0.37 (0.02)	0.387 (0.02)	0.364 (0.02)	0.35 (0.02)	0.364 (0.02)	0.365 (0.02)	0.353 (0.019)	0.365 (0.02)	0.344 (0.02)	0.335 (0.02)	0.344 (0.02)
Residuals	4.93 (0.027)	4.88 (0.027)	4.93 (0.027)	4.48 (0.027)	4.44 (0.027)	4.48 (0.027)	4.86 (0.027)	4.82 (0.027)	4.86 (0.027)	4.45 (0.027)	4.41 (0.027)	4.45 (0.027)

Shaded cells are statistically significant at the .05 level. Standard errors are bootstrapped to fully account for the uncertainty in both our measure of the events data and manifesto data.

Meanwhile, in Models G-L, we present result relevant to H4. In these specifications we interact our events measure with a measure of habitual news receptions built from factual questions about current political events that we asked in the same surveys we used to measure the dependent variable (see Appendix 6 for details).

The results are consistent with our expectation that the effect of conflictual and cooperative partisan events reported in the news will be larger for respondents with increasingly higher levels of habitual news reception. Specifically, the implied coefficient on the events variable for individuals with low political knowledge is about an order of magnitude bigger for respondent who had high levels of habitual news reception vs. those who had low levels. The implied coefficient on the events variable for those with low levels of habitual news reception is between 0.034 and 0.087, between 0.169 and 0.219 for those with medium levels, and between 0.278 and 0.335 for those with high levels of habitual news reception in every case. Further, these differences are highly statistically significant.

Conclusions

Do voters have accurate beliefs about which parties regularly cooperate with one another and which do not? Our original data on voters' perceptions of partisan cooperation and conflict make it clear that, on average, voters do perceive levels of cooperation and conflict between parties that are consistent with what most political scientists familiar with the history of these parties would expect. Consistent with the general message that such perceptions are sensible, we find that differences in perceived cooperation across party-dyads correspond closely to differences in the policy/ideological compatibility of different parties, their current levels of

cabinet cooperation, and their histories of co-governance. Further, these results hold regardless of whether we measure individual perceptions of these variables (and correspondingly focus on individual variation in perceptions) or objective measures (consequently focusing on aggregated dyadic differences).

Beyond the long-term sensibility of perceptions and their drivers, the results of our statistical analysis are also consistent with the idea that these perceptions reflect the recent record of cooperative and conflictual events that make up the day-to-day interactions between parties as reported in the media. Indeed, these effects are apparent even after we account for the longer-term factors mentioned above. Likewise, our finding that the effects of the ongoing media narrative about party interactions are dramatically larger for individuals who pay close attention to the political news supports the idea that there is a direct connection between media portrayals of partisan conflict and cooperation and voter perceptions.

Of course, we would be remiss if we did not also point out the limitations of the current study. Specifically, no cross-sectional study can fully validate the kind of dynamic story intimated here. While we certainly think the evidence we present is consistent with the idea that voters (especially voters who follow the news) update their beliefs about party conflict and cooperation in responses to real world changes in those relationships, in this design we cannot definitively rule out the possibility that even for these voters, some other variable both causes the media to portray a given dyad as more or less cooperative and also influences voter perceptions of this level of cooperation (though, we know that such a variable, if it exists, is not perceived or objective policy compatibility, perceived or objective current or historical cabinet cooperation, or any other variable whose confounding pathway -- or "backdoor path" -- is

effectively blocked by any of these variables – e.g., see Pearl 2000). To rule out such confounders definitively would likely require that we track changes in perceptions over time, ideally with a panel of voters. While we leave that effort to future work, we do think the preponderance of the evidence thus far suggest that citizens not only have a firm grasp of the cooperative or conflictual nature of partisan relationships in their systems but that they (or at least some of them) update these perceptions as the political landscape changes.

For Review Only

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Appendix 1: The Cases and Survey

We conducted two rounds of surveys in Canada, Germany, and the UK, and one survey in Denmark. The surveys were administered on the Qualtrics platform and samples were recruited from Qualtrics LLC's online panels. Participants were not informed in advance that the survey was about politics and quotas were imposed on age and gender to match population targets in each country. Although there are some time gaps between the two rounds of surveys in Canada, Germany, and the UK, we prevented the same respondent from participating in both rounds of the survey.

We obtain participants' consent online since the study is conducted in an online survey format. Once a participant is invited (by Qualtrics) and the respondent voluntarily access the survey page, the consent page is shown before the actual survey starts. On that very first page, agreement will be made voluntarily by ticking a box. Survey non-compliance was identified using a variety of strategies (e.g., straight-liners and speeders) and these respondents were excluded from the sample

Rewards for participation and completion of the survey was managed by the survey company. Qualtrics confirmed that their respondents received an incentive based on the length of survey, their specific panelist profile, and target acquisition difficulty. The specific types of rewards vary and may include cash, airline miles, gift cards, and vouchers. Tables A1.1 and A1.2 provide additional information on the surveys.

Table A1.1: Survey fieldwork and samples

	Country	Fieldwork	Sample
First Round	Canada	Nov. 27 - Dec. 5, 2017	1105
	Germany	Mar. 28 - Apr. 5, 2018	1039
	United Kingdom	Nov. 27 - Dec. 5, 2017	1025
Second Round	Canada	Mar. 26 - May 1, 2019	1000
	Denmark	Oct. 30 - Nov. 30, 2019	1278
	Germany	Aug. 8 - Sep. 5, 2019	1017
	United Kingdom	Jan. 24 - Feb. 5, 2019	995

Table A1.2: Descriptive statistics

		First Round (2017-2018)					Second Round (2019)				
		Mean	SD	Min	Max	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max	N
Canada	Male	0.506	0.5	0	1	1105	0.5	0.5	0	1	1000
	Age	49.083	15.61	18	76	1104	48.47	17.11	18	76	1000
	Education	6.767	1.4	2	9	1105	6.793	1.5	1	10	1000
	Pol. Interest	2.855	0.86	1	4	1105	2.857	0.89	1	4	1000
Germany	Male	0.503	0.5	0	1	1041	0.502	0.5	0	1	1017
	Age	48.115	17.01	18	76	1041	48.143	16.47	18	76	1017
	Education	5.053	3.62	1	11	1041	5.695	1.572	1	10	1017
	Pol. Interest	3.307	0.73	1	4	1041	3.251	0.85	1	4	1017
UK	Male	0.507	0.5	0	1	1025	0.501	0.5	0	1	995
	Age	47.401	16.23	18	76	1025	48.143	16.49	18	76	995
	Education	3.867	1.21	1	11	1025	3.887	1.2	1	6	995
	Pol. Interest	2.952	0.9	1	4	1025	2.975	0.85	1	4	995

Denmark	Male	NA	0.481	0.5	0	1	1278
	Age		46.053	16.52	18	76	1278
	Education		5.686	2.27	1	10	1269
	Pol. Interest		2.927	0.85	1	4	1278

Appendix 2. Alternative Specifications of the Main and Interactive Models

Table A2.1: Drivers of perceptions of partisan conflict and cooperation (using events score = 0 when there is no reporting)

DV: R's Perceived Level of Cooperation between parties <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> (avg:4.34, sd:2.5)	A	B	C	D	E	F
Events						
Cooperative and Conflictual Events relevant to parties <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> over the last year (avg: 0.027, sd: 0.39)	0.185 (0.027)	0.186 (0.027)	0.183 (0.027)	0.221 (0.031)	0.225 (0.031)	0.218 (0.031)
Ideological Distance						
Avg. Perceived LR distance between parties <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> (avg: 3.37, sd: 3.63)				-0.282 (0.003)	-0.274 (0.003)	-0.282 (0.003)
Manifesto LR Distance between parties <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> (avg: 23.7, sd: 16.7)	-0.034 (0.008)	-0.032 (0.008)	-0.029 (0.007)			
Joint Cabinet Membership						
Current Cabinet Membership (1 = parties <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> in current cabinet)	2.304 (1.28)			1.88 (1.11)		
Current Perceived Cabinet Membership (1 = R identified parties <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> as current cabinet members)		0.766 (0.021)			0.60 (0.025)	
% months in previous 10 years that parties <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> have served in cabinet (avg: 4.25, sd:13.1)			0.05 (0.01)			0.04 (0.006)
Constant	5.19 (0.25)	5.09 (0.25)	4.82 (0.19)	5.23 (0.14)	5.14 (0.14)	4.98 (0.12)
Random Intercepts						
Party Dyad	0.819 (0.185)	0.858 (0.193)	0.425 (0.096)	0.785 (0.177)	0.793 (0.0179)	0.428 (0.097)
Individuals	0.387 (0.021)	0.37 (0.02)	0.387 (0.021)	0.364 (0.02)	0.35 (0.02)	0.364 (0.02)
Residuals	4.93 (0.027)	4.88 (0.027)	4.93 (0.027)	4.48 (0.027)	4.44 (0.027)	4.48 (0.027)

Shaded cells are statistically significant at the .05 level. Standard errors are in parentheses.

Table A2.2: Drivers of perceptions of partisan conflict and cooperation (using events score over the last 6 months)

DV: R's Perceived Level of Cooperation between parties <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> (avg:4.34, sd:2.5)	A	B	C	D	E	F
Events						
Cooperative and Conflictual Events relevant to parties <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> over the last 6 months (avg: -0.001, sd: 0.55)	0.099 (0.024)	0.089 (0.023)	0.099 (0.024)	0.128 (0.024)	0.127 (0.024)	0.128 (0.024)
Ideological Distance						
Avg. Perceived LR distance between parties <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> (avg: 3.37, sd: 3.63)				-0.265 (0.004)	-0.258 (0.004)	-0.265 (0.004)
Manifesto LR Distance between parties <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> (avg: 23.7, sd: 16.7)	-0.034 (0.007)	-0.035 (0.008)	-0.033 (0.006)			
Joint Cabinet Membership						
Current Cabinet Membership (1 = parties <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> in current cabinet)	2.51 (0.676)			2.07 (0.751)		
Current Perceived Cabinet Membership (1 = R identified parties <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> as current cabinet members)		0.669 (0.027)			0.611 (0.027)	
% months in previous 10 years that parties <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> have served in cabinet (avg: 4.25, sd:13.1)			0.034 (0.007)			0.034 (0.007)
Constant	5.06 (0.19)	4.96 (0.20)	4.85 (0.172)	5.12 (0.134)	5.04 (0.136)	4.99 (0.121)
Random Intercepts						
Party Dyad	0.438 (0.109)	0.518 (0.129)	0.334 (0.083)	0.544 (0.137)	0.571 (0.144)	0.396 (0.1)
Individuals	0.438 (0.023)	0.419 (0.022)	0.438 (0.023)	0.411 (0.022)	0.394 (0.022)	0.411 (0.023)
Residuals	4.97 (0.029)	4.92 (0.029)	4.97 (0.029)	4.52 (0.029)	4.48 (0.029)	4.52 (0.029)

Shaded cells are statistically significant at the .05 level. Standard errors are in parentheses.

Table A2.3: Drivers of perceptions of partisan conflict and cooperation (using events score over the last 6 Months and events Score = 0 when there is no reporting)

DV: R's Perceived Level of Cooperation between parties <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> (avg:4.34, sd:2.5)	A	B	C	D	E	F
Events						
Cooperative and Conflictual Events relevant to parties <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> over the last 6 months (avg: 0, sd: 0.38)	0.096 (0.023)	0.083 (0.023)	0.095 (0.023)	0.128 (0.023)	0.126 (0.023)	0.127 (0.023)
Ideological Distance						
Avg. Perceived LR distance between parties <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> (avg: 3.37, sd: 3.63)				-0.282 (0.003)	-0.274 (0.003)	-0.282 (0.003)
Manifesto LR Distance between parties <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> (avg: 23.7, sd: 16.7)	-0.034 (0.008)	-0.032 (0.008)	-0.029 (0.007)			
Joint Cabinet Membership						
Current Cabinet Membership (1 = parties <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> in current cabinet)	2.51 (1.28)			2.12 (1.11)		
Current Perceived Cabinet Membership (1 = R identified parties <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> as current cabinet members)		0.764 (0.021)			0.669 (0.021)	
% months in previous 10 years that parties <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> have served in cabinet (avg: 4.25, sd:13.1)			0.051 (0.011)			0.048 (0.009)
Constant	4.98 (0.242)	4.80 (0.236)	4.68 (0.229)	5.11 (0.122)	4.97 (0.117)	4.95 (0.112)
Random Intercepts						
Party Dyad	1.62 (0.249)	1.53 (0.237)	1.32 (0.204)	1.21 (0.187)	1.13 (0.175)	0.939 (0.145)
Individuals	0.312 (0.016)	0.298 (0.015)	0.32 (0.016)	0.323 (0.017)	0.304 (0.016)	0.324 (0.017)
Residuals	4.88 (0.022)	4.82 (0.022)	4.88 (0.022)	4.37 (0.021)	4.32 (0.021)	4.37 (0.021)

Shaded cells are statistically significant at the .05 level. Standard errors are in parentheses.

Table A2.4: Drivers of perceptions of partisan conflict and cooperation (using alternative measures of cooperation history in government)

DV: R's Perceived Level of Cooperation between parties <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> (avg:4.34, sd:2.5)	A	B	C	D
Events				
Cooperative and Conflictual Events relevant to parties <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> over the last year* (avg: 0.048, sd: 0.52)	0.19 (0.027)	0.192 (0.027)	0.231 (0.031)	0.233 (0.031)
Ideological Distance				
Avg. Perceived LR distance between parties <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> (avg: 3.37, sd: 3.63)			-0.26 (0.004)	-0.26 (0.004)
Manifesto LR Distance between parties <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> (avg: 23.7, sd: 16.7)	-0.033 (0.009)	-0.028 (0.008)		
Joint Cabinet Membership				
% months in previous 20 years that parties <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> have served in cabinet (avg: 3.32, sd:10.6)	0.007 (0.008)		0.007 (0.007)	
% months in previous 30 years that parties <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> have served in cabinet (avg: 3.21, sd:10.2)		0.029 (0.008)		0.029 (0.007)
Constant	5.16 (0.253)	4.93 (0.227)	5.23 (0.143)	5.11 (0.14)
Random Intercepts				
Party Dyad	0.809 (0.235)	0.61 (0.147)	0.737 (0.22)	0.53 (0.128)
Individuals	0.387 (0.02)	0.388 (0.021)	0.364 (0.02)	0.364 (0.02)
Residuals	4.93 (0.027)	4.93 (0.027)	4.48 (0.027)	4.48 (0.027)

Shaded cells are statistically significant at the .05 level. Standard errors are in parentheses.

Table A2.5: Drivers of perceptions of partisan conflict and cooperation (treating support party in Denmark as part of cabinet)

DV: R's Perceived Level of Cooperation between parties <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> (avg:4.34, sd:2.5)	A	B	C	D	E	F
Events						
Cooperative and Conflictual Events relevant to parties <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> over the last year* (avg: 0.048, sd: 0.52)	0.187 (0.027)	0.188 (0.027)	0.183 (0.027)	0.226 (0.031)	0.23 (0.031)	0.221 (0.031)
Ideological Distance						
Avg. Perceived LR distance between parties <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> (avg: 3.37, sd: 3.63)				-0.26 (0.004)	-0.254 (0.004)	-0.26 (0.004)
Manifesto LR Distance between parties <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> (avg: 23.7, sd: 16.7)	-0.032 (0.009)	-0.035 (0.01)	-0.03 (0.006)			
Joint Cabinet Membership						
Current Cabinet Membership (1 = parties <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> in current cabinet)	1.74 (0.648)			1.75 (0.614)		
Current Perceived Cabinet Membership (1 = R identified parties <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> as current cabinet members)		0.654 (0.026)			0.602 (0.025)	
% months in previous 10 years that parties <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> have served in cabinet (avg: 3.21, sd: 10.2)			0.042 (0.005)			0.038 (0.005)
Constant	5.08 (0.244)	5.13 (0.252)	4.79 (0.168)	5.18 (0.138)	5.16 (0.146)	4.96 (0.109)
Random Intercepts						
Party Dyad	0.778 (0.176)	0.879 (0.198)	0.344 (0.077)	0.709 (0.16)	0.827 (0.187)	0.374 (0.085)
Individuals	0.387 (0.021)	0.37 (0.02)	0.387 (0.021)	0.364 (0.02)	0.35 (0.02)	0.364 (0.02)
Residuals	4.93 (0.027)	4.88 (0.027)	4.93 (0.027)	4.48 (0.027)	4.44 (0.027)	4.48 (0.027)

Shaded cells are statistically significant at the .05 level. Standard errors are in parentheses.

Table A2.6: Drivers of perceptions of partisan conflict and cooperation with country-survey fixed effect

DV: R's Perceived Level of Cooperation between parties <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> (avg:4.34, sd:2.5)	A	B	C	D	E	F
Events						
Cooperative and Conflictual Events relevant to parties <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> over the last year* (avg: 0.048, sd: 0.52)	0.125 (0.034)	0.12 (0.033)	0.12 (0.034)	0.182 (0.045)	0.189 (0.45)	0.174 (0.044)
Ideological Distance						
Avg. Perceived LR distance between parties <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> (avg: 3.37, sd: 3.63)				-0.26 (0.004)	-0.25 (0.004)	-0.26 (0.004)
Manifesto LR Distance between parties <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> (avg: 23.7, sd: 16.7)	-0.037 (0.009)	-0.037 (0.01)	-0.033 (0.007)			
Joint Cabinet Membership						
Current Cabinet Membership (1 = parties <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> in current cabinet)	2.04 (0.827)			2.01 (0.808)		
Current Perceived Cabinet Membership (1 = R identified parties <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> as current cabinet members)		0.67 (0.025)			0.6 (0.025)	
% months in previous 10 years that parties <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> have served in cabinet (avg: 3.21, sd: 10.2)			0.041 (0.006)			0.038 (0.006)
Country-Survey Fixed Effect	Included					
Constant	5.14 (0.328)	5.06 (0.334)	5.06 (0.238)	5.19 (0.244)	5.05 (0.25)	5.19 (0.186)
Random Intercepts						
Party Dyad	0.597 (0.145)	0.64 (0.154)	0.304 (0.075)	0.579 (0.131)	0.613 (0.014)	0.331 (0.075)
Individuals	0.382 (0.02)	0.365 (0.02)	0.382 (0.02)	0.361 (0.02)	0.347 (0.02)	0.361 (0.02)
Residuals	4.91 (0.027)	4.87 (0.027)	4.91 (0.027)	4.47 (0.027)	4.43 (0.027)	4.47 (0.027)

Shaded cells are statistically significant at the .05 level. Standard errors are bootstrapped to fully account for the uncertainty in both our measure of the events data and manifesto data (both these are estimated quantities with associated measures of uncertainty available).

Table A2.7: Drivers of Perceptions of Partisan Conflict and Cooperation by Habitual News Reception (Using Events Score = 0 when There is no Reporting)

DV: R's Perceived Level of Cooperation between parties <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> (avg:4.34, sd:2.5)	A	B	C	D	E	F
Events						
Cooperative and Conflictual Events relevant to parties <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> over the last year (avg: 0.027, sd: 0.39)	0.026 (0.038)	0.046 (0.037)	0.025 (0.038)	0.06 (0.04)	0.081 (0.04)	0.057 (0.04)
Habitual News Reception (Base=Low Habitual News Reception)						
Medium Habitual News Reception	-0.448 (0.019)	-0.42 (0.019)	-0.448 (0.019)	-0.334 (0.02)	-0.308 (0.02)	-0.334 (0.02)
High Habitual News Reception	-0.721 (0.019)	-0.657 (0.019)	-0.721 (0.019)	-0.577 (0.02)	-0.517 (0.02)	-0.577 (0.02)
Events Score*Habitual News Reception (Base=Low Habitual News Reception)						
Events Score*Medium Habitual News Reception	0.146 (0.044)	0.13 (0.04)	0.146 (0.04)	0.154 (0.038)	0.142 (0.038)	0.154 (0.04)
Events Score*High Habitual News Reception	0.275 (0.04)	0.236 (0.04)	0.275 (0.04)	0.29 (0.038)	0.254 (0.038)	0.289 (0.039)
Ideological Distance						
Avg. Perceived LR distance between parties <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> (avg: 3.37, sd: 3.63)				-0.274 (0.003)	-0.268 (0.003)	-0.274 (0.003)
Manifesto LR Distance between parties <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> (avg: 23.7, sd: 16.7)	-0.034 (0.008)	-0.032 (0.008)	-0.028 (0.007)			
Joint Cabinet Membership						
Current Cabinet Membership (1 = parties <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> in current cabinet)	2.33 (1.27)			1.9 (1.11)		
Current Perceived Cabinet Membership (1 = R identified parties <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> as current cabinet members)		0.69 (0.021)			0.611 (0.02)	
% Months in previous 10 years that parties <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> have served in cabinet (avg: 4.25, sd:13.1)			0.05 (0.011)			0.046 (0.009)
Constant	5.39 (0.241)	5.19 (0.235)	5.09 (0.229)	5.41 (0.122)	5.25 (0.118)	5.25 (0.113)
Random Intercepts						
Party Dyad	1.6 (0.25)	1.53 (0.235)	1.32 (0.203)	1.22 (0.188)	1.14 (0.176)	0.951 (0.147)
Individuals	0.292 (0.015)	0.277 (0.015)	0.292 (0.015)	0.3 (0.016)	0.287 (0.015)	0.3 (0.016)
Residuals	4.81 (0.022)	4.76 (0.022)	4.81 (0.022)	4.33 (0.021)	4.288 (0.021)	4.33 (0.021)

Shaded cells are statistically significant at the .05 level. Standard errors are in parentheses.

Table A2.8: Drivers of perceptions of partisan conflict and cooperation by habitual news reception (using events score over the last 6 Months)

DV: R's Perceived Level of Cooperation between parties <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> (avg:4.34, sd:2.5)	A	B	C	D	E	F
Events						
Cooperative and Conflictual Events relevant to parties <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> over the last 6 months (avg: -0.001, sd: 0.55)	-0.02 (0.035)	-0.025 (0.035)	-0.02 (0.035)	0.01 (0.04)	0.015 (0.035)	0.009 (0.035)
Habitual News Reception (Base=Low Habitual News Reception)						
Medium Habitual News Reception	-0.513 (0.024)	-0.491 (0.024)	-0.513 (0.024)	-0.383 (0.026)	-0.361 (0.026)	-0.383 (0.026)
High Habitual News Reception	-0.787 (0.025)	-0.731 (0.025)	-0.787 (0.025)	-0.621 (0.027)	-0.565 (0.027)	-0.621 (0.027)
Events Score* Habitual News Reception (Base=Low Habitual News Reception)						
Events Score*Medium Habitual News Reception	0.146 (0.038)	0.148 (0.038)	0.146 (0.04)	0.127 (0.039)	0.125 (0.039)	0.127 (0.039)
Events Score*High Habitual News Reception	0.164 (0.039)	0.154 (0.039)	0.164 (0.04)	0.181 (0.04)	0.17 (0.039)	0.182 (0.04)
Ideological Distance						
Avg. Perceived LR distance between parties <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> (avg: 3.37, sd: 3.63)				-0.256 (0.004)	-0.249 (0.004)	-0.255 (0.004)
Manifesto LR Distance between parties <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> (avg: 23.7, sd: 16.7)	-0.037 (0.007)	-0.035 (0.008)	-0.032 (0.006)			
Joint Cabinet Membership						
Current Cabinet Membership (1 = parties <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> in current cabinet)	2.57 (0.69)			2.12 (0.004)		
Current Perceived Cabinet Membership (1 = R identified parties <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> as current cabinet members)		0.594 (0.027)			0.556 (0.027)	
% Months in previous 10 years that parties <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> have served in cabinet (avg: 4.25, sd:13.1)			0.036 (0.007)			0.034 (0.007)
Constant	5.5 (0.193)	5.39 (0.211)	5.28 (0.178)	5.45 (0.137)	5.36 (0.139)	5.32 (0.123)
Random Intercepts						
Party Dyad	0.459 (0.114)	0.553 (0.137)	0.353 (0.088)	0.555 (0.14)	0.594 (0.15)	0.404 (0.102)
Individuals	0.412 (0.022)	0.4 (0.021)	0.412 (0.022)	0.386 (0.022)	0.376 (0.021)	0.386 (0.022)
Residuals	4.89 (0.028)	4.86 (0.028)	4.89 (0.028)	4.48 (0.029)	4.44 (0.029)	4.48 (0.029)

Shaded cells are statistically significant at the .05 level. Standard errors are in parentheses.

Table A2.9: Drivers of perceptions of partisan conflict and cooperation by habitual news reception (using events score over the last 6 months and using events score = 0 when there is no reporting)

DV: R's Perceived Level of Cooperation between parties <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> (avg:4.34, sd:2.5)	A	B	C	D	E	F
Events						
Cooperative and Conflictual Events relevant to parties <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> over the last 6 months (avg: 0, sd: 0.38)	-0.029 (0.034)	-0.037 (0.034)	-0.03 (0.034)	0.011 (0.034)	0.016 (0.034)	0.01 (0.035)
Habitual News Reception (Base=Low Habitual News Reception)						
Medium Habitual News Reception	-0.445 (0.019)	-0.417 (0.019)	-0.445 (0.019)	-0.334 (0.02)	-0.308 (0.02)	-0.334 (0.02)
High Habitual News Reception	-0.716 (0.019)	-0.652 (0.019)	-0.716 (0.019)	-0.573 (0.02)	-0.514 (0.02)	-0.573 (0.019)
Events Score* Habitual News Reception (Base=Low Habitual News Reception)						
Events Score*Medium Habitual News Reception	0.157 (0.037)	0.158 (0.037)	0.157 (0.037)	0.127 (0.038)	0.125 (0.038)	0.127 (0.038)
Events Score*High Habitual News Reception	0.169 (0.039)	0.158 (0.039)	0.169 (0.039)	0.176 (0.039)	0.159 (0.038)	0.176 (0.039)
Ideological Distance						
Avg. Perceived LR distance between parties <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> (avg: 3.37, sd: 3.63)				-0.274 (0.003)	-0.268 (0.003)	-0.274 (0.003)
Manifesto LR Distance between parties <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> (avg: 23.7, sd: 16.7)	-0.034 (0.008)	-0.032 (0.008)	-0.028 (0.007)			
Joint Cabinet Membership						
Current Cabinet Membership (1 = parties <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> in current cabinet)	2.56 (1.28)			2.17 (1.11)		
Current Perceived Cabinet Membership (1 = R identified parties <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> as current cabinet members)		0.692 (0.021)			0.613 (0.021)	
% Months in previous 10 years that parties <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> have served in cabinet (avg: 4.25, sd:13.1)			0.051 (0.011)			0.048 (0.009)
Constant	5.39 (0.242)	5.2 (0.237)	5.09 (0.229)	5.41 (0.123)	5.25 (0.119)	5.25 (0.113)
Random Intercepts						
Party Dyad	1.61 (0.248)	1.54 (0.238)	1.31 (0.202)	1.22 (0.189)	1.15 (0.178)	0.945 (0.146)
Individuals	0.292 (0.015)	0.278 (0.015)	0.293 (0.015)	0.302 (0.016)	0.287 (0.015)	0.302 (0.016)
Residuals	4.82 (0.022)	4.77 (0.022)	4.82 (0.022)	4.33 (0.021)	4.29 (0.021)	4.33 (0.021)

Shaded cells are statistically significant at the .05 level. Standard errors are in parentheses.

Table A2.10: Drivers of perceptions of partisan conflict and cooperation by habitual news reception (with country-survey fixed effect)

DV: R's Perceived Level of Cooperation between parties <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> (avg:4.34, sd:2.5)	A	B	C	D	E	F
Events						
Cooperative and Conflictual Events relevant to parties <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> over the last year* (avg: 0.048, sd: 0.52)	-0.016 (0.045)	-0.005 (0.044)	-0.023 (0.044)	0.028 (0.053)	0.052 (0.052)	0.025 (0.054)
Habitual News Reception (Base=Low Habitual News Reception)						
Medium Habitual News Reception	-0.439 (0.023)	-0.416 (0.023)	-0.439 (0.023)	-0.315 (0.025)	-0.293 (0.024)	-0.315 (0.025)
High Habitual News Reception	-0.703 (0.024)	-0.644 (0.023)	-0.703 (0.024)	-0.549 (0.025)	-0.492 (0.025)	-0.549 (0.025)
Events Score* Habitual News Reception (Base=Low Habitual News Reception)						
Events Score*Medium Habitual News Reception	0.139 (0.043)	0.13 (0.042)	0.141 (0.043)	0.147 (0.041)	0.137 (0.041)	0.149 (0.041)
Events Score*High Habitual News Reception	0.262 (0.049)	0.228 (0.048)	0.263 (0.049)	0.272 (0.046)	0.241 (0.045)	0.276 (0.046)
Ideological Distance						
Avg. Perceived LR distance between parties <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> (avg: 3.37, sd: 3.63)				-0.252 (0.004)	-0.246 (0.004)	-0.252 (0.004)
Manifesto LR Distance between parties <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> (avg: 23.7, sd: 16.7)	-0.037 (0.01)	-0.037 (0.01)	-0.033 (0.007)			
Joint Cabinet Membership						
Current Cabinet Membership (1 = parties <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> in current cabinet)	2 (0.823)			1.99 (0.81)		
Current Perceived Cabinet Membership (1 = R identified parties <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> as current cabinet members)		0.595 (0.025)			0.547 (0.025)	
% Months in previous 10 years that parties <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> have served in cabinet (avg: 4.25, sd:13.1)			0.041 (0.006)			0.038 (0.006)
Country-Survey Fixed Effect	Included					
Constant	5.51 (0.323)	5.41 (0.341)	5.42 (0.235)	5.46 (0.245)	5.31 (0.252)	5.46 (0.187)
Random Intercepts						
Party Dyad	0.592 (0.145)	0.638 (0.154)	0.303 (0.074)	0.584 (0.132)	0.62 (0.141)	0.335 (0.076)
Individuals	0.361 (0.019)	0.349 (0.019)	0.361 (0.019)	0.341 (0.019)	0.332 (0.019)	0.341 (0.019)
Residuals	4.85 (0.027)	4.81 (0.027)	4.85 (0.027)	4.43 (0.027)	4.4 (0.027)	4.43 (0.027)

Shaded cells are statistically significant at the .05 level. Standard errors are bootstrapped to fully account for the uncertainty in both our measure of the events data and manifesto data (both these are estimated quantities with associated measures of uncertainty available).

Appendix 3: Distribution of Perceived Cooperation of Parties

Figure A3.1: Distribution of perceived cooperation among parties in Canada







Figure A3.2: Distribution of perceived cooperation among parties in Denmark



Denmark 2019 (cont'd)




Perceived Cooperation Scores


Dashed line indicates the average cooperation score

View Only

Figure A3.3: Distribution of perceived cooperation among parties in Germany





Dashed line indicates the average cooperation score



Dashed line indicates the average cooperation score

Figure A3.4: Distribution of perceived cooperation among parties in the UK



Appendix 4: Brief Explanation of Foundational Models of Attitude Formation

In online processing models, individuals are thought to have an on-line tally about a given concept that is stored in long-term memory (in this case, a feeling about how cooperative or conflictual two parties are). This tally gets updated each time the individual consumes a relevant piece of information (e.g., a relevant news story suggesting cooperation). The direction of the update depends on whether the event is cooperative or conflictual and the size depends on its emotional resonance). Thus, while the details of the event are quickly forgotten, the impact of the event on long-term feelings is preserved in the tally.

In memory-based models, when an individual is asked a survey question about the extent of cooperation between two parties, they give an opinion which is a direct function of any relatively information they have in memory. Thus, the more recent and the more pervasive information about partisan conflict and cooperation, the bigger its impact on perceptions. While the online processing model of perception formation strikes us as a better fit to the kind of perception formation we are describing, it is not at all necessary for us to take a position in the debate between online and memory-based processing since both could motivate our hypothesis (and we have no means to distinguish between them empirically given the structure of our data).

A useful review that combines the insights from both memory-based and online models of attitude formation and change is Taber and Young 2013. "Political Information Processing." In the *Oxford handbook of Political Psychology* (2nd edition). Oxford University Press.

Appendix 5: Conditional Effect of Habitual News Reception on Parties' Policy Profiles and Cabinet Participation

It is likely that individuals who follow the political news are also generally more interested in politics and (according to recent work by, for example, Prior 2019¹) have been interested in politics most of their lives. This means that these individuals likely learned and retained more information about the parties' relative policy commitments and traditional patterns of cooperation in cabinet than other citizens – and more generally have better developed associative networks surrounding all political phenomena. Thus, we expect that these more politically interested and knowledgeable people will also evidence stronger associations between party ideologies and cabinet participation than their less interested counterparts. And, indeed, this is exactly what we find as shown in Tables A4.1 and A4.2, where we fully interact our empirical models with levels of habitual news reception. Given space constraints, however, we focus in the main text on the relationship most relevant for this paper: the robust connection between real world cooperative and conflictual partisan events and voters perceptions of partisan cooperation and conflict.

Table A4.1: Effect of ideological distance on perceived level of cooperation between parties by levels of habitual news reception

DV: R's Perceived Level of Cooperation between parties <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> (avg:4.34, sd:2.5)	A	B	C	D	E	F
Events						
Cooperative and Conflictual Events relevant to parties <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> over the last year (avg: 0.048, sd: 0.52)	0.179 (0.027)	0.182 (0.027)	0.178 (0.027)	0.225 (0.031)	0.23 (0.03)	0.221 (0.03)
Habitual News Reception (Base=Low Habitual News Reception)						
Medium Political Knowledge	-0.196 (0.031)	-0.19 (0.031)	-0.2 (0.031)	-0.26 (0.03)	-0.24 (0.03)	-0.26 (0.03)
High Political Knowledge	-0.041 (0.031)	-0.012 (0.031)	-0.041 (0.031)	-0.24 (0.03)	-0.19 (0.03)	-0.24 (0.03)
Ideological Distance						
Avg. Perceived LR distance between parties <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> (avg: 3.37, sd: 3.63)				-0.235 (0.005)	-0.229 (0.005)	-0.235 (0.005)
Manifesto LR Distance between parties <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> (avg: 23.7, sd: 16.7)	-0.019 (0.008)	-0.018 (0.008)	-0.014 (0.007)			
Ideological Distance*Habitual News Reception (Base=Low Habitual News Reception)						
Avg. Perceived LR distance between parties <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> *Middle Habitual News Reception				-0.025 (0.007)	-0.024 (0.007)	-0.025 (0.007)

¹ Prior, Markus. 2019. *Hooked: How politics captures people's interest*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Avg. Perceived LR distance between parties <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> *High Habitual News Reception				-0.1 (0.007)	-0.1 (0.007)	-0.096 (0.007)
Manifesto LR Distance between parties <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> *Middle Habitual News Reception	-0.011 (0.001)	-0.01 (0.001)	-0.011 (0.001)			
Manifesto LR Distance between parties <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> *High Habitual News Reception	-0.029 (0.001)	-0.028 (0.001)	-0.03 (0.001)			
Joint Cabinet Membership						
Current Cabinet Membership (1 = parties <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> in current cabinet)	2.36 (1.28)			1.91 (1.09)		
Current Perceived Cabinet Membership (1 = R identified parties <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> as current cabinet members)		0.67 (0.021)			0.614 (0.02)	
% Months in previous 10 years that parties <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> have served in cabinet (avg: 4.25, sd:13.1)			0.05 (0.01)			0.046 (0.009)
Constant	5.05 (0.24)	4.88 (0.236)	4.76 (0.23)	5.28 (0.121)	5.12 (0.117)	5.13 (0.11)
Random Intercepts						
Party Dyad	1.6 (0.25)	1.53 (0.236)	1.32 (0.2)	1.18 (0.18)	1.1 (0.17)	0.92 (0.14)
Individuals	0.29 (0.015)	0.28 (0.015)	0.29 (0.015)	0.3 (0.016)	0.29 (0.015)	0.3 (0.016)
Residuals	4.78 (0.021)	4.73 (0.021)	4.78 (0.022)	4.32 (0.021)	4.28 (0.021)	4.32 (0.021)

Shaded cells are statistically significant at the .05 level. Standard errors are in parentheses.

Table A4.2: Effect of cabinet participation on perceived level of cooperation between parties by levels of habitual news reception

DV: R's Perceived Level of Cooperation between parties <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> (avg:4.34, sd:2.5)	A	B	C	D	E	F
Events						
Cooperative and Conflictual Events relevant to parties <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> over the last year (avg: 0.048, sd: 0.52)	0.176 (0.027)	0.177 (0.027)	0.165 (0.027)	0.222 (0.031)	0.23 (0.03)	0.211 (0.031)
Habitual News Reception (Base=Low Habitual News Reception)						
Medium Political Knowledge	-0.459 (0.019)	-0.5 (0.021)	-0.505 (0.02)	-0.347 (0.02)	-0.385 (0.022)	-0.395 (0.021)
High Political Knowledge	-0.74 (0.019)	-0.75 (0.021)	-0.817 (0.02)	-0.6 (0.02)	-0.611 (0.022)	-0.674 (0.02)
Ideological Distance						
Avg. Perceived LR distance between parties <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> (avg: 3.37, sd: 3.63)				-0.274 (0.003)	-0.267 (0.003)	-0.273 (0.003)
Manifesto LR Distance between parties <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> (avg: 23.7, sd: 16.7)	-0.034 (0.008)	-0.031 (0.008)	-0.028 (0.007)			
Joint Cabinet Membership						
Current Cabinet Membership (1 = parties <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> in current cabinet)	1.58 (1.28)			1.09 (1.11)		
Current Perceived Cabinet Membership		0.41			0.367	

(1 = R identified parties <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> as current cabinet members)		(0.032)			(0.032)	
% Months in previous 10 years that parties <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> have served in cabinet (avg: 4.25, sd:13.1)			0.035 (0.011)			0.033 (0.009)
Joint Cabinet Membership*Habitual News Reception (Base=Low Habitual News Reception)						
Current Cabinet Membership *Middle Habitual News Reception	0.776 (0.133)			0.793 (0.128)		
Current Cabinet Membership *High Habitual News Reception	1.22 (0.127)			1.31 (0.121)		
Current Perceived Cabinet Membership *Middle Habitual News Reception		0.397 (0.045)			0.333 (0.044)	
Current Perceived Cabinet Membership *High Habitual News Reception		0.559 (0.048)			0.495 (0.047)	
% Months in previous 10 years that parties <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> have served in cabinet*Middle Habitual News Reception			0.015 (0.001)			0.014 (0.001)
% Months in previous 10 years that parties <i>i</i> and <i>j</i> have served in cabinet*High Habitual News Reception			0.026 (0.001)			0.024 (0.001)
Constant	5.4 (0.24)	5.24 (0.234)	5.14 (0.229)	5.42 (0.122)	5.31 (0.117)	5.3 (0.11)
Random Intercepts						
Party Dyad	1.6 (0.25)	1.51 (0.232)	1.32 (0.2)	1.22 (0.188)	1.11 (0.17)	0.95 (0.147)
Individuals	0.29 (0.015)	0.28 (0.014)	0.29 (0.015)	0.3 (0.016)	0.28 (0.015)	0.3 (0.016)
Residuals	4.81 (0.021)	4.76 (0.022)	4.8 (0.022)	4.32 (0.021)	4.28 (0.021)	4.31 (0.021)

Shaded cells are statistically significant at the .05 level. Standard errors are in parentheses.

Appendix 6: Measurement Details

Cooperative and Conflictual Events in Media Reports

The QPR scores we use are based on all domestic events reported in the ICEWS data in the 12 months prior to the first day that a survey was in the field. Suppose these events involve a total of n actors, which includes political parties as well as other socio-political actors. The number of cooperative interactions between two actors i and j is denoted by m_{ij}^+ , and the number of conflictual interactions by m_{ij}^- . The set of all interactions is summarized in an $n \times n$ sociomatrix Y , where each entry y_{ij} summarizes the direct dyadic interactions between i and j as follows: $y_{ij} = \ln \left(\frac{m_{ij}^+ + 1}{m_{ij}^- + 1} \right)$. Interactions are treated as symmetric, so $y_{ij} = y_{ji}$.

We then estimate the following latent factor model on Y , with the idea that each actor can be represented through an unobserved, one-dimensional vector of characteristics \mathbf{u}_i :

$$y_{ij} = \alpha + a_i + a_j + \epsilon_{ij} + \mathbf{u}_i' \Lambda \mathbf{u}_j$$

$$a_1, \dots, a_n \sim \text{i.i.d. } \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma_a^2)$$

$$\{\epsilon_{ij}\} \sim \text{i.i.d. } \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma_\epsilon^2)$$

where α is the intercept, a_i and a_j are random effects that capture overall differences in the tone of interactions by actors i and j ; ϵ_{ij} is a random effects term that captures the correlation of actions between a dyadic pair of actors; and the remaining variance in y_{ij} is absorbed by the multiplicative effects term $\mathbf{u}_i' \Lambda \mathbf{u}_j$. The terms in $\mathbf{u}_i' \Lambda \mathbf{u}_j$ are estimated using an eigenvalue decomposition (see Hoff 2005, 2015²; Weschle 2018; Minhas et al. 2019³). They capture latent nodal characteristics and thus summarize the nature of the direct and indirect public interactions involving i and j . We use the subset of scores that involve two political parties as our measures of public cooperation and conflict.

Objective differences in party policy positions:

To compute the objective differences in policy positions between any two parties, we rely on the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) to calculate the differences in their positions on the left-right scale (RILE score) from the most proximate election.

² Hoff, Peter D. 2005. "Bilinear Mixed Effects Models for Dyadic Data." *Journal of the American Statistical Association* 100 (469): 286–95.

Hoff, Peter D. 2015. "Dyadic Data Analysis with amen." <http://arxiv.org/abs/1506.08237>.

³ Minhas, Shahrya, Peter D. Hoff, and Michael Ward. 2019. Inference Approaches for Network Analysis: AMEN for Latent Factor Models. *Political Analysis*, 27(2), 208–222.

Subjective difference in parties' policy positions:

We utilize a question from our seven original surveys to measure parties' policy positions, which is then used to measure the differences between any two parties in each context. In each survey, respondents were asked to place 5 to 6 parties on a left-right scale.⁴ Specifically, they were asked the following question:

"In politics, people sometimes talk of "Left" and "Right". Using the scale from 0 to 10, where would you place yourself and political parties listed below? Even if you are not completely sure, please give us your best guess."

We simply measure the subjective difference in parties' policy positions for a pair of party as the absolute difference in the answer respondents give to this question for the two parties in the dyad.

Objective measure of joint governance:

We create a dummy variable indicating whether the parties in each dyad were both in the cabinet at the time of the survey.

Subjective measure of joint governance:

Our measure of perceived joint cabinet membership is based on a survey question that asked respondents the role that each party in their respective context played in or out of cabinet at the time of our survey. The question asks:

"Please choose the option which best describes each party's role in the current government."

The respondents were then asked to choose whether the party holds the Prime Ministry position, holds a position in the cabinet but not the party of the Prime Minister, supports the cabinet (only in Denmark), is an opposition, or do not hold any seats in the parliament. We then create a dichotomous variable where we code the variable as "1" if a pair of party are both in the cabinet and "0" otherwise.

Historical measures of cooperation in cabinet

We measure this concept by calculating the percentage of months in the 10, 20, and 30 years before our survey, that the two parties in the dyad were in the same cabinet.

Habitual News Reception

We measure three levels of habitual news reception (low, medium, and high) based on our respondents' number of correct answers to factual questions.⁵ We divide the respondents to three groups based on their answers to three general political knowledge questions and three current events questions (where we use an additive scale to produce a score). The three general political knowledge questions ask the name of the country's Finance minister, current unemployment rate, and the name of foreign country's important political figure (e.g., In the UK survey, we asked the name of the current leader of Germany's SPD; the current leader of the UK's Labour Party in Canadian and German surveys; the current Prime

⁴ Respondents in Canada were required to place 5 parties, while respondents in Denmark, Germany, and the UK were required to place 6 parties.

⁵ Since our theoretical concept is quite directly about paying attention to the news, we prefer this measure to more general measures like the respondent's reported level of interest in politics.

Minister of Sweden in our Danish survey). Meanwhile, for the current event questions, we simply look for international or domestic events that are covered by the country's main media outlets at the time of the survey. The questions were chosen to include events that were very widely reported, less widely reported, and narrowly reported to get good discrimination across the scale. Below is the list of current event questions used in our surveys:

Canada 2017

1. Quite recently (in November 2017) Prime Minister Justin Trudeau took a foreign trip to meet other world leaders. To which region of the world did he travel?
2. Who is Canada's new Governor General?
3. On November 28th, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau will give a speech apologizing for the historical mistreatment of which group?

Canada 2019

1. In which country did Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un meet during their summit in February 2019?
2. Which two countries engaged in military conflicts over territorial disputes in late February 2019?
3. Which former Canadian Minister of Justice accuses the Liberal government of intervening in an independent criminal prosecution of SNC-Lavalin?

Denmark 2019

1. From which middle east country did President Trump recently order US troops to withdraw?
2. Who is the new leader of Christian Democrats?
3. The Danish government has recently notified the European Commission of its plan to reintroduce temporary checks along its border with Sweden. For how long would the temporary boarder checks be in place?

Germany 2018

1. Who did Angela Merkel appoint to be the secretary general of CDU?
2. Which country has denied entry to Lutz Bachmann, the founder of the German far-right group Pegida?
3. Which German mayor has called for a basic income benefit for people who are unemployed?

Germany 2019

1. Who is the current (new) leader of CDU?
2. Who is the new prime minister of the UK?
3. Who is the German politician who was elected to be the President of the European Commission in July 2019?

UK 2017

1. In which country of the union is a minimum price for alcohol going to be introduced?
2. Which politician has recently been accused of sexual harassment?

3. Which city has the European Union chosen to replace London as the home of the European Banking Authority?

For Review Only

UK 2019

1. Who is the former Nissan chairman who was arrested for financial misconduct?
2. Which country recently granted asylum to a Saudi teenager, Rahaf Mohammed al-Qunun, who fled her family for fear of violence?
3. In mid-January 2019, Prime Minister May's proposed Brexit deal was rejected in the parliament. By about how many votes was the proposed deal rejected?

All questions (except for current unemployment rate) are multiple choice with four response options. Don't Know option is not offered, but instead we encouraged respondents to make their best possible guess. That said, we use different criteria (i.e., number of correct answers) depending on the country to make three almost-equal sized groups based on the distribution of the political knowledge score. The distribution of the low, medium, and high level of habitual news reception groups across countries over time is in the table below.

Table A5.1: Distribution of levels of habitual news reception

Country	Year	Level of habitual news reception	Number of correct answers (out of 6)	Proportion
Canada	2017	Low	0-2	35.5%
		Medium	3-4	34.25%
		High	5-6	30.25%
	2019	Low	0-2	30.9%
		Medium	3-4	35.9%
		High	5-6	33.2%
Denmark	2017	Low	0-3	34%
		Medium	4	23.4%
		High	5-6	42.6%
Germany	2018	Low	0-1	22.8%
		Medium	2-3	38.9%
		High	4-6	33.3%
	2019	Low	0-2	23.7%
		Medium	3-4	28.8%
		High	5-6	47.5%
UK	2017	Low	0-2	35.7%
		Medium	3-4	43.2%
		High	5-6	21.1%
	2019	Low	0-1	27.7%
		Medium	2-3	44.5%
		High	4-6	27.7%

Appendix 7: Details of the Bootstrap Procedure

We account for the uncertainty in the events data by randomly sampling 500 different event scores (with replacement) for a given pair of parties from a normal distribution that is centered on the average cooperation score with the relevant standard deviation. We also incorporate uncertainty in the party's RILE score using the method developed by Benoit, Laver, and Mikhaylov (2009)⁶. For each party, we sample a simulated RILE score from a normal distribution with a given mean and standard deviation. We then calculate the absolute difference in the simulated RILE score for a given pair of parties to get a simulated value of the distance variable. We repeat this sampling procedure 500 times.

Once we have 500 different simulated values for events score and ideological distance based on the manifesto, we could now run the regression with bootstrap. Below are the steps that we take to obtain the bootstrapped coefficients and standard errors as reported in Tables 1 and 2 of the main text:

1. Sample the events score and difference in the RILE score 500 times.
2. Fit a regression model that include crossed random intercepts for respondent and dyad to each sample.
3. Store the 500 coefficients and the standard errors
4. Calculate the average of the 500 coefficients to get the bootstrapped coefficient
5. For each of the 500 regressions, draw 500 coefficients from a normal distribution where the mean is the estimated coefficient, and the standard deviation is the standard error.
6. Calculate the standard deviation of the 250,000 simulated coefficients to obtain the bootstrapped standard errors of the coefficients.

⁶ Benoit, Kenneth., Laver, Michael., & Mikhaylov, Slava. 2009. "Treating Words as Data with Error: Uncertainty in Text Statements of Policy Positions." *American Journal of Political Science*, 53(2), 495–513.